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The media perspective in the study of scientific abstraction 
 
 
What I have chosen to refer to as the "media perspective" is a way of looking at 
science, its history and its philosophy which has been successfully employed in a 
number of recent studies. In these works, the term “medium” rarely occurs, but I 
believe that the experiences of media studies can be very helpful for historians and 
philosophers of science in looking at things from this perspective. This approach 




Scientific knowing between production and communication 
 
Scientific knowing is a process resulting both in new concepts and in new forms 
capable of expressing them, two aspects which can be distinguished only in a first 
approximation. 
This remark may seem quite trivial, as it applies not only to science, but to a 
much broader range of human activities. However, in science the dynamics of form 
and content has a unique character because of the great variety of elements which 
can take part in it: material objects, symbolic and linguistic codes - each with its 
own rules -  codified descriptions, pictorial and non-pictorial images, numbers, 
moving displays, tables, standardized procedures - and more. In fact, any a priori 
limitation of this list would be regarded by many as non-scientific.  
If knowledge is never independent from its modes and contexts of 
production and communication, the above list corresponds to an equally unlimited 
variety of knowing enterprises. At the same time, scientific knowing seems to be 
characterized by a drive never to rest in one medium, be it word, experimental set-
up, number or operational definition. The result is a constant tension between 
theory and practice, an entanglement of materiality and abstraction whose richness 
grows with technical possibilities. 
Looking at the above list of elements participating in the scientific enterprise, 
one might be tempted to distinguish between tools to produce knowledge, on the 
one side, and symbolic forms to communicate it, on the other. In fact, though, a 
number of recent studies have shown how each of the elements listed above can 
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play the role both of a symbol and of a tool, often at the same time.1 The "abstract 
concept" dissolves between production and communication, and it is therefore very 
important to pay attention to the all elements taking part in both processes, and 
also to shifts and mixtures between one element and the other. 
For example, one has to be aware of the shift between the codified 
description of a standard procedure and its actual performance, or between a 
mathematical formula,  its verbal interpretation and its computational 
implementation to obtain numerical results. Such differences can be obscured 
when speaking of "temperature measurement" or of "the law of universal 
gravitation”. 
In this paper, I would like to discuss two fields in which I believe looking at 
things from  this perspective can be a particularly fruitful complement to other 
approaches in science studies. The first field relates to the construction and use of 
instruments and, more in general, of material set-ups, the second one to 
quantification and mathematisation of science and in science. 
 
 
Construction  as  reflection 
 
Instruments do not only contribute as tools to the production of new scientific 
ideas: they can also come to be regarded as an embodiment of pre-existing 
concepts - "pre-existing", though, in another form. 
For example, late medieval mechanical clocks were seen as embodying the 
idea of "temperance", i.e. of self-regulation: of a stable middle state between two 
extremes, a state to which a system is drawn back when straying from it.2 This was 
a central concept in medieval Aristotelian philosophy, and the earliest images of 
mechanical clocks show us that medieval people were just as interest in the self-
regulating inner mechanisms of the clocks as in their outer displays.  
The same could happen also with other kinds of material set-ups, as for 
example chemical experiments. In medieval and early modern times, the process of 
distillation of alcohol was seen as representing the idea that there is no clear-cut 
opposition between body and soul. Instead, a “spiritual” component could be 
extracted from matter step by step, by a process of  refinement which was not a 
                                                 
1 To quote only a few: P. Galison, Image and logic. A material culture of microphysics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997); H.-J. Rheinberger, Instrumente und Objekte im 
experimentellen Kontext der Wissenschaften vom Leben, in: H. Schramm, L. Schwarte and J. 
Lazardzig (eds.), Instrumente in Kunst und Wissenschaft (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006) pp. 1-20; L. 
Roberts, S. Schaffer and P. Dear (eds.), The mindful hand. Inquiry and invention from the late Renaissance 
to early industrialisation (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 
2007). 
2 L. White jr., The iconography of 'Temperantia' and the virtuousness of technology, in: L. White, 
jr., Medieval religion and technology. Collected essays (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) pp. 
181-204. 
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mechanical separation, but rather resembled the distillation of spirits from wine or 
from other substances.3 
Once a material set-up comes to be regarded by some as representing 
specific conceptual structures, the act of experimenting in its construction and use 
can acquire a significance going well beyond the immediate results of the 
experiment. The whole process can be an (abstract) reflection in a form more 
material than that of a few symbols written on paper.  
Looking at things from this perspective has helped better understand early 
modern instruments and experiments: astronomical clocks, mechanical and 
pneumatic devices, alchemical practice.4 For the most part, these products were 
neither useful tools, nor crucial experiments, nor toys for adults: they might be 
regarded as reflections guided by the initiative of human actors, the broader social 
and cultural context and the premises and constraints of the material set-ups. 
Different material set-ups could be linked to different world-views: mechanical 
philosophy to mechanical automata, chemical philosophy to (al)chemical 
experiences, libertarian philosophies to self-regulating, feed-back devices.5 
Moreover, reflections made  in different material forms could be coupled 
with diverging conceptions of  "true knowledge". For mechanical philosophers, the 
paradigm of knowledge were often the disembodied geometrical structures 
necessary for constructing clockworks. For craftsmen and alchemists of the 
Renaissance, instead, knowledge was something that had to be reached by bodily 
activity, and that implied some material effect.6  
 
 
Entanglement between the material and the abstract  
 
Conceptual structures developed as material set-ups are often transposed into 
another form - for example a text or a formula, although early modern alchemists 
were much more creative. In the process of transposition, instruments and 
procedures can be translated into a verbal, graphical or symbolic form, to become 
themselves a theory. This was the case of the (impossible) ‘perpetuum mobile’ and 
                                                 
3 F. S. Taylor, The idea of the quintessence, in: E. A. Underwood (ed.), Science, medicine and history. 
Essays in the evolution of scientific thought and practice written in honour of C. Singer, vol. 1 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1953) pp. 247-265. 
4 D. Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with objects. The transformation of mechanics in the seventeenth century 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006); A. G. Debus, The Paracelsian aerial niter, 
Isis 55 (1964): 43–61. 
5 A. Borrelli, Pneumatics and the Alchemy of Weather: What Is Wind and Why Does It Blow?, 
in: S. Zielinski and E. Fürlus (eds.), Variantology 3. On deep time relations of arts, sciences and technologies 
(Cologne: Verlag Walther König, 2007) (forthcoming); O. Mayr, Authority, liberty, and automatic 
machinery in early modern Europe (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986); D. J. de 
Solla Price, Automata and the origins of mechanism and mechanistic philosophy, Technology and 
Culture 5 (1964): 9–23. 
6 P. H. Smith, The body of the artisan. Art and experience in the scientific revolution (Chicago: University  
of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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of steam-engines, whose behaviour was schematised in ‘Carnot's engine’, a concept 
central to thermodynamics. 
Sometimes, this kind of translations are regarded by historians or 
philosophers as metaphors, as for example the clockwork-universe metaphor of 
late medieval and early modern times. Although the meaning of the term 
“metaphor” is itself open to much discussion, it is important to note how these 
metaphors were often more than superficial analogies, and that, in studying them, 
one has to keep in mind their material origin: clockwork-metaphors from the years 
1400, 1600 and 1800 can be as different as the clocks of those ages. 
In modern science, the complex relationship between abstract and material 
devices is particularly fascinating, for example in “operational definitions”, when 
temperature is defined as that which is measured by a thermometer, or electrical 
charge is defined as that which can be detected by following certain procedures. 
More often than not, operational definitions involve the description of 
measurement units defining a physical quantity. 
Operational definitions are so important to the conceptual architecture of 
modern science, that it has been (unsuccessfully) attempted to reduce all scientific 
concepts to operationally defined ones.7 Operational definitions are verbal 
descriptions coupled with very precise, codified graphical, symbolical and numerical 
statements. They are not “thought experiments”, on the contrary: they are 
specifically formulated (1) to imply  that all information they contain comes from  
experiences actually performed, (2) to allow the exact reproduction of those 
experiences, and (3) to serve as reference point for future, as-yet-untried 
experiments. Still, an operational definition is usually not the immediate description 
of an actually performed procedure, and standard instruments are not real, 
individual instruments. 
For example: the unit of  temperature (Kelvin), is defined in terms of (at 
least) four completely different standardized measuring systems (“thermometers”), 
each working in a different temperature range, with overlapping edges.8 These 
technical aspects of the definition are then connected with the formal - though not 
fully mathematical - apparatus of thermodynamics, to finally define the Kelvin. 
This process might at first look like an "upward" shift from the material-
experimental level to the theoretical-symbolic one, but it is no such thing. In most 
cases, when experimentally studying the behaviour of one part of a material system, 
one makes assumptions in symbolic-theoretical form on the properties of another 
part of the same system - e.g. when observing the expansion of mercury in a 
thermometer, one has to make assumptions on the expansion rate of the glass 
casing of that same thermometer. Those assumptions are of course derived from 
experience, but they are mediated in verbal, numerical or graphical form. In the 
end, standardized instruments and procedures are made out of an entanglement of 
material, symbolic, verbal  and graphical elements. I say "entanglement", because 
                                                 
7 G. Schlesinger, Operationalism, Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Second Edition  7 (2006) pp. 29-33. 
8 A detailed discussion of the definition of the Kelvin scale can be found for example in: J. 
Fischer and B. Fellmuth, Temperature metrology, Rep. Prog. Phys. 68 (2005): 1043-1094. 
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these devices cannot be regarded as material or abstract “in degrees”, as though the 
shift from materiality to abstraction, from body to mind, were something linear. In 
fact, each material-experimental step in one directions can bring with it an abstract-
theoretical step in another one, and different devices move in completely different 
directions.  
To appreciate the composite nature of such a construct one has to look into 
the details of each instance, trying to reconstruct how a quantity comes to be and 
goes on living as both a quantity and that specific quantity resulting from that specific 
process.  
In other words, quantities are abstract constructs, but it still does make a 
difference whether a quantity is measured with an instrument, counted on the 
fingers or given as output by a formula or a computer simulation.  
 
 
Mathematics, the senses and mathematical apparatuses  
 
Not only quantities, but in general mathematical objects are not usually considered 
as something which can be bodily experienced - and experienced in a number of 
different ways. However, mathematical statements have to be learned, 
communicated and employed through sensory and bodily experience, and these 
bodily aspects of mathematics can make a great difference as to how mathematical 
statements and their implications are conceived.9 
Taking this fact into account is very important when studying  pre-modern 
epochs, where mathematical statements could be expressed in logically ordered 
verbal statement, which one went through as steps on a ladder, or in the form of 
geometric constructions performed with ruler and compasses. 10 In the latter case, a 
clear-cut distinction between theory and practice was hardly possible. 
Perhaps the best known example of this dynamics is the history of Newton's 
laws of motion, from their formulation by Newton as verbal, Latin statements to 
the form Euler put them in, which looks almost exactly like the one in today's 
textbooks. Newton's laws were not -could not be - the same as Euler's.11 
In modern times, the complexity both of written notations and of 
computational systems has grown enormously. I believe it would be of the greatest 
interest to study under this perspective at least one single instance of the 
                                                 
9 On this subject, see for example: M. Ascher, Ethnomathematics. A multicultural view of mathematical 
ideas (New York: Chapman & Hall, 1994); B. Rotman, Mathematics as sign. Writing, imagining, counting 
(Stanford: Standofrd University Press, 2000). 
10 W. Lefevre (ed.), Picturing machines: 1400-1700 (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2004); A. Borrelli, 
The flat sphere, in: S. Zielinsky and D. Link (eds.), Variantology 2. On Deep Time Relations of Arts, 
Sciences and Technologies (Köln: Verlag Walther König, 2006) pp. 145-166; A. Borrelli, Aspects of the 
astrolabe: ‘architectonica ratio’ in tenth- and eleventh-century Europe (Stuttgart: Steiner, forthcoming). 
11 G. Maltese, The ancient's Inferno: the slow and tortuous development of 'Newtonian' 
principles of motion in the eighteenth century, in: A. Becchi et al., Essays in the history of mechanics. 
In memory of Clifford Ambrose Truesdell and Edoardo Benvenuto (Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag, 2003) pp. 
199-221. 
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employment of computers in scientific computations, simulations and data-analysis. 
Here I mean investigating not just algorithms,  inputs and outputs, but all levels of 
software and hardware, as well as their interaction with humans. Very often, these 
aspects are discussed by substituting them with schematic representations, 
mathematical formulas and logic diagrams - again, a shift. 
Even when only written symbolic formalism is involved, not all 
mathematical formulas and mathematical methods are equivalent: specific 
formalisms and methods can suggest specific ways in which the objects presented 
can be manipulated in a sort of virtual kinaesthetic experiences. Such a case has 
been analysed by Ursula Klein in nineteenth-century chemical notation.12 To 
describe the function of the changing symbolism, she has introduced the term 
"paper tool". 
In modern physics, the situation is often more complex than in chemistry. 
Even within the same notation and the same physical-mathematical theories (e.g. 
classical or quantum mechanics), scientists can choose from a great variety of 
models and methods to frame and solve problems. Each method has its own 
premises and inner rules, and it is not unusual for different methods to be not fully 
compatible with each other. These complexes are more like gigantic “paper 
apparatuses” than like “paper tools”, and theoretical scientists can often choose, 
combine and modify them in very creative  ways, trying to connect them with the 
one or the other experimental input.  
In conclusion, the practice of mathematical theory is not just an interplay 
between mathematical forms and physical concepts taking place in the mind of a 
scientist, but rather the conflict and conflation between different mathematical-
physical-digital (and sometimes also verbal and philosophical) apparatuses being 
used and transformed by a collective of human agents. It can be very interesting to 
look at mathematics, too, from a media perspective. 
 
                                                 
12 U. Klein, Experiments, models, paper tools. Cultures of organic chemistry in the nineteenth century 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
